Epistemic practices such as decision-making, revision of beliefs, and problem-solving are at the centre of the life of an organisation. They are enacted at different levels of the organisations, from work-teams to the board of directors. These practices are performed to manage and distribute the knowledge produced within the organisation. Some virtue epistemologists have recently approached knowledge management in organisation from a virtue theoretical account (de Bruin 2013), quite often with a key-reference to the Aristotelian notion of phronesis (Costello 2019). Some epistemic virtues, such as intellectual courage, temperance, and generosity have been investigated as crucial for the positive and constructive management of knowledge within the organisation, and as instrumentally valuable in the realisation of business ends. But the real-life of an organisation is not just made of virtues. Epistemic vices are spread in many segments of the knowledge management process. Epistemic vices such as closed- mindedness, negligence, and insouciance are cognitive defects that impede effective and responsible epistemic practices. Epistemic vices are usually conceptualised as character traits and thus, as the individual epistemic agent's styles of thought (Cassam 2016). For instance, prejudice as giving credit where it isn’t due, and failing to give it where it is due, impedes serious inquiry. As a consequence, it results to be a deceiving way of thinking. Baird and Calvard (2019) have