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the claim
Cournot duopoly firms with differing costs produce asymmetric output quantities in equilibrium.
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SUPPORTED
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3 sources for · 0 against

Reference material on oligopoly theory explicitly notes that firms facing differing cost functions in a Cournot duopoly yield non-identical (asymmetric) equilibrium quantities.

Evidence for · 3
2013 · cited by 10
In this paper, we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfì in Topics in Game Theory (2012), Carfì ICT 2009, Carfì AAPP 2009, Carfì GO 2009; already employed by himself and others in Carfì TPREF 2011, Carfì AAPP 2010, Carfì ISGC 2009) and some new algorithms, using the software wxMaxima 11.04.0, in order to reach a total scenario knowledge (that is the total knowledge of the payoff space of the interaction) of the classic Cournot Duopoly (1838), viewed as a complex interaction between two competitive subjects, in a particularly interesting asymmetric case. Moreover, in this work we propose a theoretical justification, for a general kind of asymmetric duopolistic interactions (which often appear in the real economic world), by considering and proposing a Cobb-Douglas perturbation of the classic linear model of production costs.
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The analysis

rails:sufficiency:supported:single_source:for=1+2p:against=0+0p | v55:sufficiency

More for · 2
2022 · cited by 7
Abstract This letter explores the quantum version of a Cournot duopoly game with general isoelastic demand and asymmetric production costs by applying Li-Du-Massar's minimal quantization rules, and it especially analyzes the existence region of quantum equilibrium, and the influences of quantum entanglement , difference in marginal costs ( k ) and elasticity of demand on the optimal profits of both firms. The results show that the existence region decreases with γ and k increasing. A larger elasticity of demand can destroy the profits of both firms. If positive γ and k are more favourable to the profits of two firms. If the first firm's profit increases with γ increasing for fixed k , but decreases with k increasing for fixed γ . The second firm's profit increases with k increasing for any fixed γ . As to the influences of γ on the second firm's profit, when k is less than a critical value, it increases with γ increasing, otherwise it decreases with γ increasing for fixed k .
cited by 0
Stackelberg's duopoly. In this model, the firms move sequentially to determine their quantities (see Stackelberg competition). Cournot's duopoly. In this model An oligopoly (from Ancient Greek ὀλίγος (olígos) 'few' and πωλέω (pōléō) 'to sell') is a market in which pricing control lies in the hands of a few sellers. As a result of their significant market power, firms in oligopolistic markets can influence prices through manipulating the supply function. Firms in an oligopoly are mutually interdependent, as any action by one firm is expected to affect o Q 2 = 2 ( M − C M ) − 2 Q 1 = 96 − 2 Q 1 {\displaystyle Q_{2}=2(M-C_{M})-2Q_{1}=96-2Q_{1}} [1.2] Equation 1.1 is the reaction function for firm 1 {\displaystyle 1} . Equation 1.2 is the reaction function for firm 2 {\displaystyle 2} . The Nash equilibrium can thus be obtained by solving the equations simultaneously or graphically. Reaction functions are not necessarily symmetric. Firms may face differing cost functions, in which case the reaction functions and equilibrium quantities would not be identical.
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  1. Quantum Cournot duopoly game with general isoelastic demand and asymmetric production costspeer-reviewedno side taken
  2. Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly: A Game Complete Analysispeer-reviewedno side taken
  3. Oligopolyreferenceno side taken
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