Consciousness must necessarily display intentionality
the verdict
CONTESTED
contested - evenly split
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
1 source for · 1 against
Philosophical perspectives and theories regarding consciousness and intentionality are divided, with some views binding them together while others recognize them as distinct features of mental states.
are contrasted with various
intentionalist views that bind them together: externalist and
non-externalist; reductive and non-reductive; restrictive and
inclusive; reflexivist and non-reflexivist. This section links to two
supplementary discussions: one summarizes recent ways of arguing for
intentionalism; the other considers how intentionalism figures in
classic phenomenological writings. Section (6) focuses on the
restrictive/inclusive contrast, and on issues regarding
“cognitive phenomenology”. Section (7) returns to the
reflexivist theme, and higher-order representationalist and
self-representationalist accounts of consciousness—linking to a
supplementary discussion of consciousness of self. Section (8)
considers how one’s view of the relationship of consciousness to
intentionality might figure in one’s understanding of its place
in the mind generally. Finally, Section (9) suggests some ways in
which the issues of previous sections impinge on four broad areas of
philosophical interest: the nature and boundaries of mind and self;
the place of consciousness and intentionality in explanation; forms of
knowledge and justification; and kinds and instances of value.
1. The Interpretation of “Consciousness”
2. The Interpretation of “Intentionality”
3. Consciousness and Intentionality in Phenomenology
4. Intentionality and the Analytic Heritage
5. Varieties of Intentionalism
6. How Rich is Consciousness?
7. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
8. Consciousness in Mind
9. Why It Matters
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This entry includes the following supplementary documents linked into
the text, as described above.
Arguments for Intentionalism
Phenomenology and Intentionalism
Consciousness of Self
1. The Interpretation of “Consciousness”
On an understanding fairly common among philosophers, consciousness is
the feature that makes states count as experiences in a
certai
Philosophers traditionally recognize two key features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or ‘what it’s like’ aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This chapter overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness.