ional claim is a claim, not about anything that is actually occurring at the time, but rather that some particular thing is prone to occur, under certain circumstances. Suppose Harry thinks plaid ties are hideous. Only rarely does the thought or judgment that they are hideous actually come to the forefront of his mind. When it does, he possesses the belief occurrently. The rest of the time, Harry possesses the belief only dispositionally. The occurrent belief comes and goes, depending on whether circumstances elicit it; the dispositional belief endures. The common representationalist warehouse model of memory and belief suggests a way of thinking about this. A subject dispositionally believes P if a representation with the content P is stored in their memory or “belief box” (in the central, “explicit” case: see §2.2). When that representation is retrieved from memory for active deployment in reasoning or planning, the subject occurrently believes P . As soon as they move to the next topic, the occurrent belief ceases. As the last paragraph suggests, one needn’t adopt a dispositional approach to belief in general to regard some beliefs as dispositional in the sense here described. In fact, a strict dispositionalism may entail the impossibility of occurrent belief: If to believe something is to embody a particular dispositional structure, then a thought or judgment might not belong to the right category of things to count as a belief. The thought or judgment, P , may be a manifestation of an overall dispositional structure characteristic of the belief that P , but it itself is not that structure. Though the distinction between occurrent and dispositional belief is widely employed, it is rarely treated in detail. Important discussions include Price (1969), Armstrong (1973), Lycan (1986), Searle (1992), Audi (1994), and Bartlett (2018). David Hume (1740) famously offers an account of belief that treats beliefs principally as occurrence