Behavioral breakdowns occur in game theory experiments
Behavioral breakdowns, such as the collapse of cooperation or deviations from mutually beneficial equilibria, frequently occur in game theory experiments under specific structural or incentive conditions.
The claim is specific, empirical, and falsifiable regarding whether behavioral breakdowns happen in game theory experiments. Papers [0], [1], and [4] provide explicit experimental and theoretical evidence showing that cooperation often breaks down under certain conditions, such as excess loner bots, strict imitation scenarios, or failed attempts at extortion outside Nash equilibria. None of the papers refute the claim, so the balance verdict is SUPPORTED.
Sharma G, Guo H, Shen C, Tanimoto J. Small bots, big impact: solving the conundrum of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma game through simple strategies.. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2023.0301
The study demonstrates that excessive introduction of certain bot strategies can inhibit cooperation and result in a breakdown of cooperation.
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Si Z, He Z, Shen C, Tanimoto J. Cooperative bots exhibit nuanced effects on cooperation across strategic frameworks.. 2025. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2024.0427
The paper notes that under certain strategic frameworks and imitation scenarios, bot interventions can disrupt or fail to alter cooperative equilibria.
D'Arcangelo C, Andreozzi L, Faillo M. Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas.. 2021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96061-9
The research reveals that attempts at extortion outside of Nash equilibria lead directly to a breakdown of cooperation.
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