All epistemologies suffer from the regress of justifications problem
the verdict
REFUTED
the evidence says no
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
0 sources for · 3 against
Philosophical literature indicates that not all epistemologies suffer from the epistemic regress problem, noting that alternative frameworks like foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism structure justifications differently or view the regress as non-vicious.
The traditional epistemic regress problem preys upon the thought that knowledge requires something more than correct judgment. That is, if we must earn or succeed at something in order to lay claim to knowledge, the skeptic can employ the epistemic regress problem to attack our ability to meet those success conditions. Despite the fact that many contemporary epistemologists do maintain some success conditions for knowledge, epistemology largely carries on unphased by the epistemic regress problem. In this paper, I will argue that the traditional epistemic regress problem is insufficient in its generality and that, for this reason, many who should otherwise engage with the problem are correct to ignore it. After elaborating on this problem, I will propose a more effective version of the epistemic regress problem based on a new, minimal epistemic standard that creates epistemic success conditions applicable to all normative epistemologies.
Epistemology, Infinitism in | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
# Infinitism in Epistemology
This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a chain take? Foundationalists opt for non-repeating finite chains. Coherentists (at least linear coherentists) opt for repeating finite chains. Infinitists opt for non-repeating infinite chains. Appreciable interest in infinitism as a genuine competitor to coherentism and foundationalism developed only in the early twenty-first century.
The article introduces infinitism by explaining its intuitive motivations and the context in which they arise. Next it discusses the history of infinitism, which is mostly one of neglect, punctuated by brief moments of hostile dismissal. Then there is a survey of arguments for and against infinitism.
For the most part, philosophers have assumed that knowledge requires justified belief. That is,
The Regress Problem | Springer Nature Link
# The Regress Problem
- Chapter
- Open Access
- First Online: 27 June 2017
- pp 1–24
- Cite this chapter
You have full access to this open access chapter
## Abstract
The attempt to justify our beliefs leads to the regress problem. We briefly recount the problem’s history and recall the two traditional solutions, foundationalism and coherentism, before turning to infinitism. According to infinitists, the regress problem is not a genuine difficulty, since infinite chains of reasons are not as troublesome as they may seem. A comparison with causal chains suggests that a proper assessment of infinitistic ideas requires that the concept of justification be made clear.
## Chapter PDF
### Foundationalism and Coherentism
### Beliefs, Epistemic Regress and Doxastic Justification
### Infinitism: rival or common ground in answering the epistemic regress?
## Author information
### Authors and Affiliations
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg
Authors
David Atkinson
Search author on: PubMed Google Scholar
Jeanne Peijnenburg
Search author on: PubMed Google Scholar
## Rights and permis
Everything we examined (3)
This check searched the claim as stated. It did not run a separate search for evidence against it.