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the claim
Aerodynamic forces broke up the Challenger orbiter due to exceeding structural load limits
the verdict
OVERSTATED
true in a weaker form than the claim states
refutedsupported
the weight of evidence
2 sources for · 0 against

Reference documentation and historical accounts note that Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart during flight, but the provided sources do not establish the specific mechanism of aerodynamic forces exceeding structural load limits.

The narrower version of this claim is missing from this receipt.

Evidence for · 2
2016 · cited by 0
Safety Rethink: The Challenger Accident (1986) | Springer Nature Link Skip to main content Advertisement Safety Rethink: The Challenger Accident (1986) Chapter First Online: 30 November 2016 pp 79–100 Cite this chapter Save chapter View saved research Spaceplane HERMES Abstract On the exceptionally cold Florida morning of January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger was launched on what should have become its tenth mission. As the vehicle speeded up across clear blue skies, a design flaw in the solid rocket boosters led to the right-hand one developing a breach, spewing hot exhaust onto its attachment to the large orange external fuel tank. This bracket gave way under the heat, the booster broke loose and punctured the tank, leading to an explosion-like ignition of the now dispersed hydrogen-oxygen mixture. The orbiter Challenger disintegrated under aerodynamic forces while exiting the fireball. When pieces of the shuttle slammed into the surface of the Atlantic Ocean a number of minutes later, the crew cabin, which had escaped the inflagration relatively unharmed, violently collapsed, killing the seven-astronaut crew [1]. The American space programme had lost its first crew during a mission and it was in fact the first loss of life during the ascent phase of any spaceflight. Access this chapter Log in via an institution Subscribe and save Springer+ from €37.37 /Month Starting from 10 chapters or articles per month Access and download chapters and articles from more than 300k books and 2,500 journals Cancel anytime View plans Buy Now Chapter EUR 29.95 Price includes VAT (Indonesia) Available as PDF Read on any device Instant download Own it forever Buy Chapter eBook EUR 50.28 Price includes VAT (Indonesia) Available as EPUB and PDF Read on any device Instant download Own it forever Buy eBook Softcover Book EUR 59.99 Price excludes VAT (Indonesia) Compact, lightweight edition Free shipping worldwide - view details Buy Softcover Book Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout Purchases are for personal use only Institutional subscriptions Similar content being viewed by others Challenger Chapter © 2019 Of monkeys, mice and men Chapter © 2024 Correcting a Policy Mistake Chapter © 2019 Explore related subjects Discover the latest articles, books and news in related subjects, suggested using machine learning. Chemical Safety Disaster References For a full review of the accident, see the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, United States Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 9 June 1986 Google Scholar AFP Sciences, No 493, 30 January 1986 Google Scholar Hermes growth uprates Ariane 5, Flight International, 2 August 1986, p 21 Google Scholar Europeans Add Escape System, Second Engine to Hermes Design, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 July 1986, p 24 Google Scholar Scénario européen “2000” d’infrastructure et de transport spatial, Air & Cosmos, 21 November 1987, p 45 Google Scholar Declaration on the Ariane-5 development program, ESA/PB-Ariane/LXXXV/Dec. Matthias Knopp, ESA INT068, 11 March 2010 Google Scholar 7 Questions: Dr Ernst Högenauer, Avianews International No 142, June 1986, p 52 Google Scholar L’Allemagne reporte a l’eté 1987 sa decision sur le projet Hermes, Air & Cosmos, 28 June 1986, p 45 Google Scholar British space plan presented, Flight International, 12 July 1986, p 19 Google Scholar A space transporter for the year 2000, Ernst Högenauer, Executive Intelligence Review, volume 14, number 20, 20 February 1987, pp 28-37 Google Scholar Germany competes with Hotol, Flight International, 30 August 1986, p 86 Google Scholar L’industrie allemande soutient Hermes, Air & Cosmos, October 18, 1986, p 61 Google Scholar France et Allemagne s’engagent sur Hermes, Air & Cosmos, October 25, 1986, p 60 Google Scholar Espace, Air & Cosmos, November 1, 1986, p 5 Google Scholar La RFA doute des Couts et délais d’Hermes, Air & Cosmos, 8 November 1986, p 42 Google Scholar ESA/IPC/MIN/87, 1 October 1986, HAEU, ESA-10242 Google Scholar ESA/IPC/MIN/88 1 October 1986, HAEU, ESA, 10243 Google Scholar Air & Cosmos, October 25, 1986, p 5 Google Scholar Nouvelle definition du programme de station européenne Columbus, Air & Cosmos, 21 June 1986, p 33 Google Scholar Ambitious European Space Projects Underscore Growing Capabilities, Aviation (2017). Safety Rethink: The Challenger Accident (1986). In: Spaceplane HERMES. Springer Praxis Books(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44472-7_4 Download citation .RIS .ENW .BIB DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44472-7_4 Published : 30 November 2016 Publisher Name : Springer, Cham Print ISBN : 978-3-319-44470-3 Online ISBN : 978-3-319-44472-7 eBook Packages : Physics and Astronomy Physics and Astronomy (R0) Share this chapter Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content: Get shareable link Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.
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The analysis

rails:sufficiency:supported:for=2+0p:against=0+0p | v55:sufficiency | v55:coherence_repaired:what=both

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orbiters were built during the Space Shuttle program. Challenger (OV-099) was the second orbiter constructed after its conversion from a structural test On January 28, 1986, Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members. The spacecraft disintegrated about 46,000 feet (14 km) above the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 16:39:13 UTC (11:39:13 a.m. EST, local time at the launch site). It was the first fatal accident involving an American spacecraft while in flight. The missi At T+58.788, a tracking film camera captured the beginnings of a plume near the aft attach strut on the right SRB, right before the vehicle passed through max q at T+59.000. The high aerodynamic forces and wind shear likely broke the unintentional aluminum oxide seal that had replaced eroded O-rings, allowing the flame to burn through the joint. Within one second from when it was first recorded, the plume became well-defined, and the enlarging hole caused a drop in internal pressure in the right SRB. A leak had begun in the liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank of the ET at T+64.660, as indicated by the changing shape of the plume. The SSMEs pivoted to compensate for the booster burn-through, which was creating an unexpected thrust on the vehicle. The pressure in the external LH2 tank began to drop at T+66.764 indicating that the flame had burned from the SRB into the… The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the disintegration was masked. Our final conclusions are: the cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined; the forces to which the crew were exposed during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew modul At T+58.788, a tracking film camera captured the beginnings of a plume near the aft attach strut on the right SRB, right before the vehicle passed through max q at T+59.000. The high aerodynamic forces and wind shear likely broke the unintentional aluminum oxide seal that had replaced eroded O-rings, allowing the flame to burn through the joint. Within one second from when it was first recorded, the plume became well-defined, and the enlarging hole caused a drop in internal pressure in the right SRB. A leak had begun in the liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank of the ET at T+64.660, as indicated by the changing shape of the plume. The SSMEs pivoted to compensate for the booster burn-through, which was creating an unexpected thrust on the vehicle. The pressure in the external LH2 tank began to drop at T+66.764 indicating that the flame had burned from the SRB into the tank. The crew and flight controllers made no indication they were aware of the vehicle and flight anomalies. At T+68, the CAPCOM, Richard O. Covey, told the crew, "Challenger, go at throttle up", indicating that the SSMEs had throttled up to 104% thrust. In response to Covey, Scobee said, "Roger, go at throttle up"; this was the last communication from Challenger on the air-to-ground loop. At T+72.284, the right SRB pulled away from the aft strut that attached it to the ET, causing lateral acceleration that was felt by the crew. At the same time, pressure in the LH2 tank began dropping. Pilot Mike Smith said "Uh-oh", which was the last crew comment recorded. At T+73.124, white vapor was seen flowing away from the ET, after which the aft dome of the LH2 tank fell off. The resulting release and ignition of all liquid hydrogen in the tank pushed the LH2 tank forward into the liquid oxygen (LOX) tank with a force equating to roughly 3,000,000 pounds (13 MN), while the right SRB collided with the intertank structure. The failure of the LH2 and LOX tanks resulted in a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), with a large part of the liquid evaporating back into gas almost instantly. These events resulted in an abrupt change to the shuttle stack's attitude and direction, which was shrouded from view by the vaporized contents of the now-destroyed ET. As it traveled at Mach 1.92, Challenger took aerodynamic forces it was not designed to withstand and broke into several large pieces: a wing, the (still firing) main engines, the crew cabin and hypergolic fuel leaking from the ruptured reaction control system were among the parts identified exiting the vapor cloud. The disaster unfolded at an altitude of 46,000 feet (14 km). Both SRBs survived the breakup of the The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the disintegration was masked. Our final conclusions are: the cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined; the forces to which the crew were exposed during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure. Pressurization could have enabled consciousness for the entire fall until impact. The crew cabin hit the ocean surface at 207 mph (333 km/h) approximately 2 minutes and 45 seconds after breakup. The estimated deceleration was 200 g, far exceeding structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels. The mid-deck floor had not suffered buckling or tearing, as would result from a rapid decompression, but stowed equipment showed damage consistent with decompression, and debris was embedded between the two forward windows that may have caused a loss of pressure. Impact damage to the crew cabin was severe enough that it could not be determined whether the crew cabin had previously been damaged enough to lose pressurization.
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  1. Safety Rethink: The Challenger Accident (1986)peer-reviewedno side taken
  2. Space Shuttle Challenger disasterreferenceno side taken
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first checked05 Aug 2026
judged → SUPPORTED · 5205 Aug 2026
held for human review05 Aug 2026
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