The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article - Purchase PDF - Access through your organization Search ScienceDirect ## Games and Economic Behavior Volume 97, May 2016, Pages 1-18 # The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness☆ Spyros Galanis Show more Add to Mendeley https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.001 Get rights and content ## Introduction In standard neoclassical economies with complete markets, where symmetrically informed agents trade state-contingent claims under uncertainty, Hirshleifer (1971) shows that providing public information may hurt all market participants, as it reduces the opportunities for risk-sharing. To provide an example, consider an economy with two risk averse agents and two, equally likely, states of the world, ah (the level of the assets of a specific company is high) and al (the level of the assets is low). The aggregate endowment for the economy is 1, constant across the two states. Agent 1 has all of the endowment at ah and nothing at al. If the agents do not receive any information before agreeing to trade, the unique equilibrium al