one set-correlate, yet two distinct objects. Intuitively speaking, the problem is clear. Neo-Meinongianism in all its varieties tends to sketch a Platonistic picture of a fictional entity, either as something akin to a Platonic attribute, or as a correlate of something else that we tend to describe in Platonic terms—a set of properties. Neo-Meinongianism thus sees a fictional object as something that pre-dates the story-telling activities that intuitively bring fictional objects into being. To see the tension between these conceptions, note that we often speak of fictional objects as the creations of storytellers or of the human mind more generally. Neo-Meinongianism, so it seems, leaves no such room for storytellers. 1.3 Creationism The intuition that story-tellers have some kind of creative role to play is accounted for by so called artifactualist , or creationist , accounts of fictional entities (see Searle 1979, Salmon 1998, Thomasson 1999, Voltolini 2006; the position was also defended in Kripke 2013, and elements of the position are found in van Inwagen’s (1977) theory of fictional objects as posits of literary criticism; Ingarden 1931 is a significant historical forerunner). According to such accounts, fictional objects are artifacts since they come into being once they are conceived by their authors; to that extent, they are authorial creations. Moreover, they are abstract entities, just as abstract neo-Meinongians believe. Unlike Platonic abstracta , however, they not only have a beginning in time, but they are also dependent entities since they depend on other entities for their existence. (Roughly speaking, an entity O existentially depends on another entity O ′ just if O couldn’t exist without O ′ existing (cf. Thomasson 1999). For a more discriminating account, one that avoids the consequence that everything existentially depends on necessary existents like natural numbers, see Fine 1994.) More specifically, fictional objec