A sequence of games has a well-defined Nash equilibrium
Evidence indicates that sequential games (or a sequence of games/moves) can have well-defined Nash equilibria, provided certain conditions like preference acyclicity are met.
Judged against reference works: claims of this kind are settled by reference works, not journal abstracts.
ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org: [1302.3973] Infinite sequential Nash equilibrium. ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org. https://ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org/html/1302.3973
Item states that sequential games have a Nash equilibrium under certain acyclicity conditions or specific quasi-Borel constraints.
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link.springer.com: A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games | International Journal of Game Theory | Springer Nature Link. link.springer.com. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-020-00735-z
Discusses finitely repeated games and pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org: [0705.3316] Acyclicity of Preferences, Nash Equilibria, and Subgame Perfect Equilibria: a Formal and Constructive Equivalence. ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org. https://ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org/html/0705.3316
States that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium.
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