A machine lacking self-reflection can satisfy the philosophical criteria for personhood
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Recent philosophical literature argues that artificial intelligence systems lacking certain traditional subjective capacities can still satisfy the requirements for moral standing and personhood.
What would qualify an artificial intelligence for moral standing? | AI and Ethics | Springer Nature Link
# What would qualify an artificial intelligence for moral standing?
- Original Research
- Open access
- Published: 25 January 2023
- Volume 4, pages 213–228 (2024)
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AI and Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript
## Abstract
What criteria must an artificial intelligence (AI) satisfy to qualify for moral standing? My starting point is that sentient AIs should qualify for moral standing. But future AIs may have unusual combinations of cognitive capacities, such as a high level of cognitive sophistication without sentience. This raises the question of whether sentience is a necessary criterion for moral standing, or merely sufficient. After reviewing nine criteria that have been proposed in the literature, I suggest that there is a strong case for thinking that some non-sentient AIs, such as those that are conscious and have non-valenced preferences and goals, and those that are non-conscious and have sufficiently cognitively complex preferences and goals, should qualify for moral standing. After responding t
# Artificial Persons
arXiv (Cornell University). Published: 2026-07-09. Preprint. 0 citations.
## Authors
- Ned Howells-Whitaker: h-index 0; 0 citations
- Seth Lazar: h-index 0; 0 citations
## Topics
- Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations
- Social Robot Interaction and HRI
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# Artificial Persons
## Abstract
Both advocates and skeptics of the moral status of AI systems have generally taken the question to turn on AI sentience. We present an alternative approach. On Rawls' political conception of the person (PCP), possession of the two moral powers-the capacities for a sense of justice and a conception of the good-is the "necessary and sufficient condition for being counted a full and equal member of society in questions of political justice". We argue that neither moral power requires sentience and that both may in principle be possessed by a non-sentient AI system. Such a system would share our own moral status; it would not merely be a patient but a person, a self-authenticating source of valid claims. We do not believe current AI systems possess the two moral powers, nor that they will spontaneously emerge in future m
Moral Agency without Consciousness | Canadian Journal of Philosophy | Cambridge Core
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# Moral Agency without Consciousness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 June 2025
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Article contents
- Abstract
- Introduction
- Definitions
- Consciousness and Action
- Consciousness and Moral Concepts
- Consciousness and Moral Reasons-Responsiveness
- Consciousness and Moral Understanding
- Further Objections
- Conclusion
- Funding statement
- Footnotes
- References
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## Abstract
Many views of moral agency include, implicitly or explicitly, a consciousness requirement—namely, the claim that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition of moral agency. This paper casts doubt on the consciousness requirement. I argue that consciousness is not necessary for instantiating four key capacities necessary for moral
What if the bar for moral standing is low? | Asian Journal of Philosophy | Springer Nature Link
# What if the bar for moral standing is low?
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- Published: 12 November 2025
- Volume 4, article number 121 (2025)
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## Abstract
In their paper “AI Wellbeing,” Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini argue that some language agents plausibly possess the capacity for wellbeing and moral standing even if they lack consciousness. My response is ambivalent. On the one hand, I am skeptical of theories of wellbeing and moral standing that lack a consciousness requirement. On the other hand, I agree with Goldstein and Kirk-Giannini (2025) that several leading theories of wellbeing and moral standing jointly imply that some language agents may be welfare subjects and moral patients and that this implication should be taken seriously. In fact, I argue that if we fully account for moral and descriptive uncertainty, we may need to lower the bar for moral standing even further
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